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UK Construction Safety: A Zero Paradox? 
The zero accident mantra has become embedded within the safety discourse of 
large UK construction organisations.  A critique has emerged around this 
phenomenon and its alignment with outmoded ‘Safety I’ thinking, a consequence 
of the dominant focus on accident causality.  But the extent to which zero-
focused approaches yield reductions in accident frequency is yet to be 
empirically investigated.  By way of an evidence-based critique, we examine the 
relationship between major accidents and zero approaches by drawing on Health 
and Safety Executive accident data over a 4 year period, together with an analysis 
of major contractors’ safety approaches.  This reveals that working on a project 
subject to a zero safety policy or programme actually appears to slightly increase 
the likelihood of having a serious life-changing accident or fatality; a possible 
‘zero paradox’.  Although these findings should be treated with caution, they 
suggest that the apparent trend towards abandoning zero amongst some large 
organisations is well-founded.  More pointedly, if zero policies are closing down 
opportunities to learn and innovate while simultaneously failing to yield 
reductions in serious accident rates, then this suggests a need to discard this 
discourse in favour of more contingent perspectives on safe working. 
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Introduction 
Zero has become the biggest number in safety (Sherratt, 2014).  It is becoming more 
prominent in academia, where it has found both critics, uncomfortable with the 
theoretical, philosophical and discursive consequences of its emergence (c.f. Dekker, 
2014; Dekker, Long and Wybo, 2016; Hollnagel, 2015; Long, 2012; Sherratt, 2014), 
and champions, who stress the differences between targets and visions (c.f. Zwetsloot, 
Aaltonen, Wybo, Saari and Kines, 2013, Zwetsloot, Kines, Wybo, Ruotsala and 
Drupsteen, 2017) and align it to other, more practical and tangible, developments in 
safety management with clear beneficial consequences (c.f. Young, 2012).  Zero has 
permeated the safety management systems of many different organisations within 
petrochemical, manufacturing and engineering industries.  Indeed, it has seemingly 
become an inherent part of the way safety is managed and delivered in practice; as Long 
(2012, p.11) points out, such organisations no longer employ Safety Managers but 
applications are now sought for ‘Zero Harm Advisors’, potentially a consequence of the 
growing influence of marketing and public relations in safety management (Sherratt, 
2016a). 
Yet it is perhaps not the labelling of Zero, or its philosophical implications or 
semantic nuances that really matter.  It could even be argued that what academics and 
corporate leaders think Zero means does not really matter very much either. What 
actually matters is the extent to which Zero tangibly influences managerial, 
administrative or operative safety practices that, in turn, affect safety outcomes.  Indeed, 
the lack of an evidenced-based evaluation of Zero is surprising given the amount of 
interest in its emergence in recent years as Zwestsloot et al (2017. p.264) argue in their 
defence of the Zero Harm Vision that there has been a lack of ‘…empirical research 
published in peer reviewed journals’ from those who critique Zero, that there is no ‘… 
strong scientific case’ that Zero has unintended consequences or negative effects on 
practice.  This paper seeks to redress this by presenting a case study of a single 
hazardous sector; the UK construction industry. Specifically, we critically examine the 
relationship between the mobilisation of Zero within organisational safety management 
and the actual numbers of potentially life-changing incidents that occurred on those 
organisations’ construction sites over a four year period. Whilst no claim is made to 
causality, analysis of this data reveals a potential Zero paradox: statistically, you are 
marginally more likely to have major/specified accident working on a large construction 
site operated by a company that has adopted Zero within their health and safety strategy, 
than if you are working on a site without it. 
The UK Construction Industry and Zero 
It is often suggested that construction is not like any other industry in terms of 
health and safety management, in part because of the inherent hazards and risks 
associated with construction work itself, yet consideration should also be given to the 
wider way construction work is structured, and the pressures this also brings to safety 
management on sites.   
A Hazardous Workplace 
On construction sites, the work environment is constantly changing and growing 
as work progresses.  This in turn inevitably creates the need for workers to be in close 
proximity to excavations, leading edges and heights, as foundations, walls and roofs are 
constructed.  This creates a wide variety of different workplace hazards, which are also 
in constant development as the next work within the project begins.  In order to carry 
out such work, heavy and potentially dangerous plant, machinery and equipment are in 
constant use, whilst toxic materials and chemicals are also frequently used.  
Construction sites present an ever-changing work space, where hazards are an inevitable 
part of the process, and their careful and continuous management within the site context 
is therefore an essential task (Sherratt, 2016b). 
Building in Unsafety 
In addition to the hazards found on the site itself, it has also been argued that the very 
way the industry operates is the fundamental cause of its poor safety record (Cipolla, 
Sheahan, Biggs and Dingsdag, 2006).  The way work is awarded to construction 
companies through competitive tendering processes can mean a focus on the direct cost 
of the labour, plant and materials for construction rather than other project 
considerations, such as safety (Lingard and Rowlinson, 2005).  Due in part to the 
project-based nature of the work, there is also a reliance on subcontracting, which often 
sees long industry supply chains working on large sites, which also has negative 
consequences for safety (Manu, Ankrah, Proverbs and Suresh, 2010).  The same 
tendering processes are also used to establish industry supply chains, and so the 
pressures on profit are squeezed tighter and tighter along them, reducing the money 
available for safety management and training (Lingard and Rowlinson 2005) within 
supply chain organisations, and it is often the smaller contractors who are most 
vulnerable to poor safety practices (Donaghy, 2009), as they strive to win work within 
such constrictive financial environments. 
Such a fragmented industry structure has in turn developed a fragmented 
workforce that is transient and temporary, with little responsibility for or even 
acceptance of safety management in practice (Seymour and Fellows 2002; Donaghy, 
2009).  This workforce is also incentivised by bonus and payment schemes that 
encourage speed and risk taking behaviours (Fellows, Langford, Newcombe and Urry, 
2002), paid for the volume of work they produce, rather than whether they produce it 
safely.  The pressures of time and cost can be seen to readily cascade throughout the 
industry, as it seeks to operate as quickly and cheaply as possible (Sherratt 2016b)to 
meet the constant demand for production (Health and Safety Executive, 2009; Lingard 
and Rowlinson, 2005).  Indeed, one quarter of the experts consulted for the Donaghy 
Report (2009) to UK Government, titled ‘One Death is Too Many’, felt that the way the 
industry is set up and work is procured has created an ethos that actively encourages 
safety accidents and incidents. 
The Cost of Construction Safety 
The challenges of managing such complexities effectively are sadly reflected in 
the human cost of construction work; it has been estimated that around 60,000 people 
die on construction sites worldwide each year (Smallwood and Lingard, 2009). Seen in 
this context, the UK construction industry is one of the safest in the world.  Compared 
to International Labour Organisation estimates from 2008, where construction worker 
fatality rates ranged from 3.3 to 10.6 deaths per 100,000 workers within certain 
industrialised countries, the UK rate was only 1.62 per 100,000 workers in 2016 (Health 
and Safety Executive, 2016) and there is an ongoing quest amongst large construction 
contractors operating in the UK to improve this even further. To this end, and reflecting 
wider safety management thinking, many large contractors have enthusiastically 
adopted Zero into their UK site safety management programmes, embedding its rhetoric 
in their health and safety policies and strategies. 
Construction Safety and Zero 
Zero has been mobilised in a variety of ways within the construction industry, 
for some ‘Beyond Zero’ is specifically positioned as a ‘visionary journey’, adopted as a 
principle of organisational management and leadership rather than a specific goal, for 
others ‘Zero Harm’ is a specific target, with zero fatalities, zero permanent disabling 
injuries and zero accidents and injuries.  In her research on Zero specifically within this 
context, Sherratt (2014) found that corporate programmes often position Zero as a 
tangible goal, a firm ‘future perfect’ reality (cf. Pitsis, Clegg, Marosszeky, and Rura-
Polley, 2003), which can be counted and measured through a plethora of targets.  Yet 
this utopia was challenged and even derided by the construction workers themselves, for 
whom the lived realities of their working lives tells them Zero is, and is likely to 
remain, a utopian fantasy, totally incompatible with the current challenges of  
production that they face on a daily basis (Sherratt 2014). Worse still, it might actually 
stymie the open dialogue and learning culture widely acknowledged as a hallmark of a 
progressive safety discourse (Long, 2012). 
And this is where Zwetsloot et al (2017) would suggest that the UK construction 
industry has got it wrong; that it has focused on the numbers and not the vision that 
should inspire real change in practice and catalyse the process of ‘innovating to zero’ 
(ibid 2017, p.263).  Yet such innovative change cannot readily be identified in UK 
construction safety management; there has been a lack of identifiable development in 
work practices beyond the simple application of ‘Brand Zero’.  As within the wider 
discourse around Zero and safety, there have recently been ripples of a sea-change in 
industry thinking.  Indeed, leading construction industry experts have recently 
suggested that the application of Zero targets to safety is actually hindering safety 
management innovation , and has rendered it a bureaucratic activity (Green, 2016), a 
consideration firmly grounded in the theoretical work of Dekker (2014).  Indeed, such a 
focus on measurement does not seek to challenge and change current practice; rather it 
aims to operate within the existing environment, seeking engagement of the workforce 
without addressing problems of practice, creating a distraction, a focus on the numbers 
and continuous improvement, rather than the practices and the people behind them 
(Sherratt, 2016b). 
Although Zwetsloot et al (2017, p.263) are at pains to point out that ‘the exact 
nature of the beliefs behind ZAV (Zero Accident Vision) are not very interesting, we 
are interested in the consequences of ZAV: the commitments that generate actions and 
programmes to develop greater safety, often using or developing innovative means’ 
(their emphasis), it would seem that for UK construction although such beliefs may not 
be ‘interesting’, they hold significant influence to practice.  They are precisely what 
makes Zero in any form a distraction, because of the allure of its measurement 
(Hollnagel, 2014, p.71), creating a misdirection in efforts to cease all harm rather than 
the harm that really matters (Dekker et al., 2016, p.222), and stifling both learning and 
reporting in an industry which already struggles to report its accidents and incidents in 
an honest and timely fashion (Donaghy, 2009; Long and Long, 2012).  It also 
disengages those to whom it should matter most, the construction site workers.  Whilst 
they are happy to position zero as a vision for the future, rather than a target, they 
remain firmly derisive of its achievement within their current working contexts; for 
them, a construction site with zero accidents is just a castle in the sky (Sherratt, 2014). 
.  This paper seeks to subject this particular context of Zero to an evidence-based 
critique and a degree of empirical scrutiny. It establishes whether large construction 
organisations operating in the UK that have adopted Zero have seen improvements over 
those who have not, whether have they developed ‘greater safety’ in practice, and 
whether they are able to show any evidence of beginning the process of ‘innovating to 
Zero’. 
Method 
Fatal and major/specified accident data for the UK construction industry in the periods 
2011-12 to 2014-15 were obtained under a Freedom of Information Request (FOI: 
201606138) to the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE).  This data recorded n=6995 
major/specified and fatal incidents as reported within the UK industry during this time 
period under UK law.  The term ‘specified injury’ replaces the previous categorisation 
of ‘major injuries’ as noted in the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous 
Occurrences Regulations 2013.  Such injuries include amputations, reductions in sight, 
crush injuries, significant burns and any loss of consciousness (HSE, 2016), all of which 
have the potential to be life-changing for the injured party.  The FOI data also included 
the name of the reporting company, which in the case of accidents occurring on large 
construction sites would most likely be the Principal Contractor, as defined by the 
Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2015. 
There are several important caveats to be considered in the use of this FOI data.  
The data for the period 2014-15 is still provisional, and so should be considered as such.  
There may also be ‘gaps’ in the data, specifically that fatal injuries are not always 
reported via the online system from which this FOI data was generated, but instead 
‘…by the emergency services or others who see it as their responsibility to do so’.  In 
addition, this dataset does not include incidents reported by the self-employed, due to 
data protection issues.  Due to the nature of subcontracting and the presence of long 
supply chains on larger projects, there is also the potential that a contractor could be in 
charge of a site on which an accident occurred, yet not be recorded as the reporting 
company within this dataset.  These caveats can, however, all be recognised as only 
having the potential to reduce the total number of accidents that actually occurred on 
large sites under the management of the named Principal Contractors.  They are unable 
to skew the data in the opposite direction and suggest that more accidents of the noted 
severity occurred on large sites than did in reality.  Therefore, despite such issues of 
validity within the dataset, it can still be used to explore the possible consequences of 
zero in practice. 
The Top 20 contractors working in the UK by turnover were identified through 
Building Magazine’s ‘Top 150 contractors and housebuilder – Ranked by Turnover’ [20 
July 2016].  Data from the period 2014/15 was used, to correlate with the accident data. 
The turnover of the UK construction industry in 2015 was £135.1bn, and the turnover of 
these Top 20 contractors combined was £52.5bn (Office of National Statistics, 2015), 
representing over 39% of all UK construction work by value.  Although these 
contractors number only 20, subcontracting practices means they will have influence on 
many sub-contractors and suppliers who work under their safety programmes on the 
large projects that make up over a third of all UK construction work by value. 
A blended approach of content analysis (Ali, 2006) was used to examine 
company websites and sustainability reports to determine each contractor’s approach to 
zero and safety.  This established whether they had an explicit zero safety policy or 
programme, for example ‘Target Zero’ or ‘Zero Harm’, or made reference to zero-
oriented metrics within their health and safety reporting.  Historic reports were also 
examined, to determine the date Zero first appeared within each contractor’s approach 
to health and safety management. The decision of whether a contractor exhibited  the 
traits of a zero accident policy was made independently by both authors in order to 
corroborate their approach.   
Within the accident data a search was carried out for each Top 20 contractor by 
name, including their operation as part of any joint-venture projects.  The numbers of 
fatal and specified/major injuries each contractor reported in the period 2011-12 to 
2014-15 was then correlated with their approach to Zero safety1. 
Findings 
Analysis of the Top 20 company data found that 9 had an explicit Zero policy in place.  
6 of these companies were operating a safety programme referencing zero, whilst the 
other 3 included clear statements around zero, for example that zero was either a target 
within their wider programme, or specifically referenced ‘incident and injury free’. 
When this data is correlated with the FOI accident data for the period 2011/12-2014/15, 
the following is initially revealed: 
                                                 
1 It should be noted here that the vast majority of accidents within the dataset did not occur on the sites of these Top 
20 contractors.  Indeed, in the UK construction health and safety is much more of a concern on small sites and 
amongst small and micro-organisations.  However, it is amongst these Top 20 organisations that Zero has emerged 
within construction site safety, and so it is this data that has been extracted for analysis. 
• There were 4 fatal accidents for companies with zero safety. 
• There were 0 fatal accidents for companies without zero safety. 
Furthermore, with regard to major/specified injuries a similar pattern emerges from the 
data within the period 2011/12-2014/15: 
• There were 214 major/specified injuries for companies with zero safety 
• There were 135 major/specified injuries for companies without zero safety 
Again, and notwithstanding the deficiencies in the dataset outlined above, this 
does not demonstrate the realisation of the most tangible aspiration of zero in practice. 
However, these statistics do not reflect the variations in volume of work carried out by 
these companies, which can be most readily ascertained through their published 
turnover.  The UK turnover of these 9 zero safety companies in 2015 was £29.1bn, 
representing nearly a quarter (22%) of all UK construction work.  The turnover of the 
11 companies operating without zero safety was £23.4bn (a difference of £5.7bn (4% of 
turnover) between the two groups).  Although turnover is not the usual metric employed 
in accident analyses (hours worked is the value used in the production of the more 
familiar Accident Frequency Rates or AFRs), it is arguably still linked to the total 
volume of work carried out on sites under the management of these companies.  
Furthermore, given the UK construction marketplace, it can also be suggested that the 
types and value of projects undertaken by these companies will to a large extent be 
comparable within this turnover figure, although it must be noted that here it is used as a 
proxy  
If these statistics are then correlated, the following is revealed: 
• There were 7 Fatal or Major/Specified accidents per billion turnover for those 
with zero safety 
• There were 6 Major/Specified accidents per billion turnover for those without 
zero safety 
Taken together, this analysis suggests the possibility of a ‘Zero Paradox’ in play 
within construction site safety for large firms: you are marginally more likely to have 
major/specified accident whilst working on a large construction site operated by a 
contractor mobilising any form of Zero safety, than if you are working on a site without 
it.  Zero, for construction on large UK sites, actually means a greater risk of injury (or 
death) in practice. 
In order to provide a consideration of timescales to better frame this data, the 
content analysis was able to reveal when each company first introduced zero to its wider 
health and safety practices, for only one organisation (company S) was this data 
unobtainable.  When this data was again correlated against the accident statistics on a 
year-by-year basis, the findings reveal mixed success, as shown in Figure 1. 
<<Figure 1 Near Here>> 
Figure 1 shows that there is no standard response within an organisation’s 
accident profile to the introduction of zero.  Indeed, for 7 of the organisations, the 
introduction of zero initially appears to increase accident rates on their sites.  Although 
for 5 organisations this initial peak was then followed by a reduction in accidents, for 
the other 5 this was not the case and despite early success with zero their accident rates 
then increased over time. While it must be acknowledged here that this data is limited to 
only 4 years, it nevertheless suggests that there is at least the potential for an increase in 
accidents following the introduction of zero safety on sites.  There is no guarantee that 
the implementation of zero safety can ensure continued or even any reduction in 
accident rates overall, and indeed seems to have limited impact in terms of catalysing 
any significant step-change improvement in safety performance. 
Discussion 
This empirical analysis has shown that the impact of Zero, the expected innovations in 
the form of changes to programmes and interventions so keenly championed by 
Zwetsloot et al (2017), are lacking in their impact to practice within the UK 
construction industry, should they even exist.  Indeed the consequences of any Zero 
safety approach, as evidenced by the corresponding figures for accidents on sites, would 
struggle to be labelled a success; there are more accidents, not fewer, under the zero 
safety banner.  Fundamentally, this analysis reveals prima facie that the notion that 
espousing Zero will bring about Zero accidents is flawed. 
Yet this is perhaps overemphasising the impact of Zero in practice.  In fact, it 
could also be argued that the introduction of Zero to UK construction safety 
management does not appear to have made a significant contribution to either any 
improvement or decline of the industry’s safety performance.  However such ‘non-
impact’ can itself be considered worthy of comment.  That Zero has not brought about 
significant change over recent years suggests that the rhetoric of Zero is masking the 
reality of construction site safety programmes which are neither innovating nor 
developing in their thinking or practice, beyond the application of this new branding.  
As suggested by critics of Zero, a focus on the numbers and the ‘bureaucratization of 
safety’ has instead created a distraction (Dekker, 2014; Sherratt, 2016b), bringing about 
Long’s (2012) ‘paralysis by analysis’, and resulting in the failure to bring real change 
for the people directly affected by poor safety management, a negative consequence of 
the implementation of Zero in practice. 
That Zero has not brought about effective change over the four year period 
examined here suggests the realisation of some of the more critical challenges made 
against it.  As Long (2012) argued, Zero in practice can easily foster the development of 
non-learning cultures, resulting in the closing down of debates around safety and a 
resultant focus on failure.  Unfortunately within this dataset, failure is all too apparent, 
and there has been a lack of coherent, evidenced improvements in safety performance 
for those operating under the banner of Zero. 
It may be that the UK construction industry is simply not yet ‘mature’ enough 
for Zero, in either its guise as a target or a vision, to work within its safety management 
operations.  However, when Zero is considered in light of the evidence presented here, 
it can even be suggested that the dis-benefits outweigh the benefits; Zero is causing 
more harm than it is able to prevent.  Within this industry context, such conclusions add 
strength to the arguments of Hollnagel (2014) and the need to dismiss Zero, or more 
specifically the quest for Zero, as a Safety-I myth, a consequence of the now-debunked 
‘causality credo’.  Instead, Hollnagel proposes Safety-II, a different approach to safety 
built upon open and honest dialogue and a focus on learning from working safely.  The 
extent to which a more dominant discourse that leans on this hypothesis would realise 
improvements in safety outcomes remains a moot point, but the open dialogue and 
recognition of alternative ways of being safe warrant further investigation.  Resonance 
can also be found with Hale and Borys’ (2013) development of Dekker’s models 1 and 
2 of safety rules.  Model 1, in the way it ‘encourages a blame culture and negative view 
of rules and violations’ (ibid 2013, p.218) readily aligns with Zero thinking, whilst 
model 2 sees safety as a continuous, dynamic social process, open discussions around 
safety a necessity for effective implementation.  Model 1 is also mobilised within the 
same top-down orthodoxy as Zero, whilst model 2 adopts a bottom-up approach to 
safety, where Zero struggles to avoid dissonance with those who cannot align it to their 
lived experiences (Donaldson, 2013; Sherratt, 2014).  More specifically, in a 
construction industry context Gherardi and Nicolini (2002) were able to illuminate the 
ways in which doing and knowing are intertwined in realising safe working outcomes 
through communities of practices, supporting the need for flexibility as found in 
Dekker’s Model 2.  They stress ‘…the importance of the conditions and modes of 
engagement in the activity’ (ibid 2002, p.217) as essential for learning safety, a direct 
challenge to the notion of safe working as a product of the hegemonic discourse of 
Zero, which is unable to reflect the realities of working safely in practice.  And it is here 
that Zero safety perhaps becomes most relevant in this context, on the sites and amongst 
the construction workers themselves, and it is here that, to support Dekker et al. (2016), 
these findings highlight that with Zero safety accidents do still happen, and so 
organisational efforts should perhaps refocus not at their causes and quixotic quests for 
their elimination, but more prosaically at their effects. 
Conclusions 
Although these findings should be treated with caution, and no claims can be made to 
causality, this paper makes two important contributions to the ongoing debate around 
Zero. Firstly, it has introduced the notion of a possible Zero Paradox – the finding that 
you are actually marginally more likely to have major/specified accident working on a 
large UK construction site operated by a company that has adopted Zero within their 
safety strategy, than if you are working on a site without it. Secondly, it has also 
enabled the consideration of theoretical criticisms of Zero to be placed within an 
empirical context, both in terms of safety outcomes (accident rates) and time.  Within 
the UK construction industry, there is no empirical evidence of greater improvements in 
safety management and resultant outcomes for companies that have adopted Zero than 
for those who have not.  Zero has arguably stymied innovation and change, or at the 
very least maintained safety management practices to industry norms with the exception 
of Zero branding. 
These findings also therefore lend weight to the various challenges levelled at 
Zero; the need for Safety II over Safety I (Hollnagel, 2014), the need to acknowledge 
Model 2 alongside Model 1 (Hale and Borys, 2013), the need to de-bureaucratise safety 
(Dekker, 2014; Long, 2012) as well as broader critiques of the Zero mantra (Long, 
2012; Sherratt, 2016a).  It suggests that it is perhaps time to abandon the flawed 
discourse of Zero and instead consider and mobilise more contingent, nuanced and 
authentic approaches to safety in practice. 
Whilst theoretical arguments abound about what Zero actually is, a vision or a 
target, our findings suggest that for the UK construction industry at least, Zero not only 
hasn’t worked, but it has been counterproductive in certain cases.  It has arguably not 
been able to bring about positive change, it has not triggered innovations in practice, 
and it has not reduced accidents.  Further research is therefore recommended to explore 
why Zero has not found any fit with UK construction sites.  Such research should 
involve those tasked with the implementation of Zero at the site level, where the 
accidents actually happen, and include site managers, supervisors and workers.  
Methods able to reveal the nuances and complexities of Zero in practice, for example 
those seeking qualitative data or mobilising ethnographic approaches, would be able to 
better illuminate its relationships with this uniquely challenging, complex, and ever-
changing workplace.   
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Figure 1. Fatal/Major accidents reported by companies following the introduction of 
zero safety 
